Stalemate best describes the state of war in Ukraine

Ivo Daalder, former U.S. ambassador to NATO, is CEO of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and host of the weekly podcast “World Review with Ivo Daalder.”
As Russia’s war on Ukraine rages on, neither country is likely to achieve a breakthrough this year — or even next. But that doesn’t mean it will be over soon. Moscow and Kyiv aren’t interested in negotiating an end to the war, or even settling for a frozen conflict.
The fighting is bound to continue for a long time.
This means the reality of the current stalemate must now inform the West’s strategy toward the conflict. And rather than counting on Ukraine to regain most or all its territory through military means, focus must shift to securing Ukraine’s future in the West.
Over the past 11 months, during which both Russia and Ukraine launched major offensives, little more than 500 square miles of territory has changed hands — that’s less than one-fifth of 1 percent of Ukraine’s territory.
Debates are now brewing about why this has happened and who’s at fault. Ukraine’s commander in chief, General Valery Zalushny, suggests current technology favors the defense: “Just like in the first world war we have reached the level of technology that puts us into a stalemate,” he said recently.
Without a big leap in technology, “there will most likely be no deep and beautiful breakthrough,” he added.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, however, argues it’s much too early to reach such a conclusion. Fearing the onset of fatalism, the Ukrainian leader rebuked his commander, and his office accused Zalushny of “easing the work of the aggressor.”
Some of the country’s strongest supporters blame the West — and especially the administration of United States President Joe Biden — for not providing Ukraine with the kind and quantity of weapons it needs to win, echoing frequent statements by Zelenskyy and others.
Meanwhile, American military officials and analysts I have spoken to lay the blame on Ukrainian tactics and political decisions, which have made achieving a military breakthrough more difficult.
They fault two critical decisions for this: First, they insist that if Ukraine had massed its armored forces more effectively, it could have broken through the surprisingly dense minefields — even though initial casualties were high when forces tried to breach them. But instead, Ukraine withdrew its forces and resorted to large-scale artillery and missile strikes against Russian defense, making little headway on the ground and depleting sparse ammunition supplies.
Equally problematic, U.S. critics argue, was the decision to try and breach Russia’s defenses at multiple points, rather than concentrating forces for a single decisive breakthrough. For example, Zelenskyy and other officials insisted on trying to recapture the town of Bakhmut, which Russia had conquered after months of bloody fighting. Even today, Ukraine deploys more forces in and around Bakhmut than any other point along the front line.
In all likelihood, all these explanations bare some truth. Washington should have sent more advanced capabilities sooner; technology likely does favor the defense on this battlefield; and Ukraine’s military and political leaders made judgements about where and how to fight, which made success less likely. History will be the ultimate judge of each justification.
For now, though, it’s important to recognize that even the current stalemate can still lead to ultimate defeat. Ukraine’s capacity to hold off Russia crucially depends on continued — and sustained — support from the U.S. and its European allies. A steady flow of weapons, ammunition, intelligence and training are all vital for Ukraine to hold the line.
This is why those who argue that the stalemate makes additional aid futile are wrong. Russia’s economy has been placed on a war footing, and its defense industry has benefited from the support of China and others in overcoming Western sanctions. It will be able to churn out weapons and manpower at a steady pace for as long as necessary, while Ukraine, on its own, can’t match either.
But even with continued Western military support to Ukraine, Moscow still has time on its side. It will try to outwait both Ukraine and those aiding it. Thus, it’s imperative the U.S. and its allies convince Russia that this isn’t actually the case.
And the best way to do this is to offer Ukraine a credible security guarantee, which makes clear to Moscow it will never be able to conquer the rest of the country. NATO leaders have already affirmed that “Ukraine’s future is in NATO.” But not only are they divided over the wisdom and timing of offering the country membership, it will also likely take years to move the process forward — as Sweden is now finding out.
Washington and key European allies should therefore consider providing Ukraine — or at least the territory it now controls — with an immediate and binding bilateral security guarantee to bridge the gap. That’s similar to the step they took after inviting Finland and Sweden to join NATO in 2022.
Such a guarantee could take a variety of forms — though it would likely fall short of the explicit guarantee enshrined in NATO’s Article 5 to regard an “armed attack against one as an armed attack against all.” For example, in the 1950s, the U.S. negotiated several bilateral security agreements with countries in Asia, which stated that in case of an armed attack, “it would act to meet the common danger” — but left the details unspecified.
The point of such an agreement would be to reassure Kyiv and, importantly, signal to Moscow that Ukraine’s security is of lasting importance to the U.S. and its allies.
The war in Ukraine is more about the country’s political future than about territory. And by providing Ukraine with tangible security guarantees, Russia would be made to understand it will never have a voice in determining Ukraine’s future.